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FAMILY REUNIFICATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NATIONALS
Iris Goldner∗
Summary: The right to free movement of EC nationals encompasses their right to be  
joined by family members and the right of these family members to be integrated into 
the host  Member State  by being granted certain  rights,  such as the right  to obtain  
employment. This paper discusses the nature, beneficiaries, legal bases and scope of  
the right to family reunification. The discussion offers a detailed analysis of current  
developments  in  this  area,  and  provides  answers  to  a  number  of  issues  raised  by  
existing Community legislation and case law. Recent trends promulgated by the ECJ’s 
case law show signs of a changing approach towards family reunification, leading to an 
acknowledgement of the right to family life as the legal basis for family reunification in  
cases  where  movement  has  occurred,  but  cannot  be  used  as  a  basis  for  applying  
Community law.
1. Introduction
The right to free movement of EC nationals encompasses their right to be joined by 
family members and the right of these family members to be integrated into the host 
Member State by being granted certain rights, such as the right to obtain employment. 
As such, it is obvious that an EC worker’s right to family reunification is based on the 
perception of a worker as a human being exercising his/her social rights when moving 
to another Member State and taking up employment there. Thus, the right to family 
reunification departs from the image of an EC worker as a solely economic unit of 
production, instead being founded on the free movement of persons as a realisation of 
one’s personal rights and on the promotion of European integration1.
The right to free movement has been conferred to the fullest degree on all EC nationals, 
with the Community being particularly keen to promote integration and the functioning 
of the internal market by stimulating its citizens to move freely from one Member State 
to  another.  Without  conferring  rights  on  EC nationals  to  bring  their  closest  family 
members  with them when migrating,  and without conferring certain rights  on those 
family members themselves, there would be little movement of EC nationals, since the 
incentive to migrate would be lacking.2 This fact has been acknowledged in Community 
secondary legislation dealing with the rights of family members of EC nationals.3
 Iris Goldner, LL.M., Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb
1 The Preamble to the EC Treaty refers to “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”.
2 Barrett, Family Matters: European Community Law and Third-Country Family Members (2003) 40 
CMLRev.  p. 376.
3 E.g. the preamble to Council Reg. 1612/68 [1968] OJ L 257/02 on freedom of movement for workers 
within the Community, which states: “the right to free movement…requires…that obstacles to the 
mobility of workers shall be eliminated, in particular as regards the worker’s right to be joined by his 
family and the conditions for the integration of that family into the host country”. Also, the preambles to 
Council Dir. 90/365 [1990] OJ L 180/28 on the right of residence for employees and self-employed 
persons who have ceased their occupational activity and to Council Dir. 90/364 [1990] OJ L 180/26 on 
the right of residence state: “this right (meaning the right of residence- author’s comment) can only be 
genuinely exercised if it is also granted to members of the family”.
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Additionally, as analysed further below, recent trends promulgated by the ECJ’s case-
law  show  signs  of  a  changing  approach  towards  family  reunification,  with  free 
movement no longer being cited as the only legal basis for granting family reunification 
rights.  Instead,  there has been a shift  of  emphasis,  moving beyond the premise that 
family reunification is a manifestation of the social facet of the free movement principle 
towards  full  recognition  of  the  family  life  of  EC nationals  as  a  human right,4 and 
consequently leading to acknowledgement of the right to family life as a legal basis for 
family reunification in cases where movement has occurred but cannot be used as a 
basis for applying Community law.5 The deepening significance of human rights as the 
legal basis for family reunification is compatible with a shift of emphasis in the area of 
the free movement of persons in general, namely, the perception of their rights as not 
only economic but also civil and social. 
Before moving on to the analysis, an important distinction between two situations must 
be made. The right to family reunification can be viewed from the perspective of those 
from whose status it derives (hereinafter “primary beneficiaries”), or of family members 
who acquire these rights due to their relation to the primary beneficiary (hereinafter 
“secondary beneficiaries”).  This paper will  discuss the position of both primary and 
secondary beneficiaries, analysing the nature, beneficiaries, legal bases and spectrum of 
rights granted. The analysis  will  mostly deal with EC national workers,  as the most 
prominent  category  of  primary  beneficiaries,  but  other  categories  of  EC  nationals 
eligible for family reunification will also be taken into consideration. The focus will be 
on the rights of secondary beneficiaries, while the rights of primary beneficiaries will be 
viewed primarily in the context of examining Community policy’s reasoning and the 
rationale behind granting rights to family members. The intention of the legislation will 
sometimes be juxtaposed with recent reasoning and judgements by the European Court 
of Justice, especially in cases of a “wholly internal situation” that could lead to reverse 
discrimination. 
2. Nature of Rights
The rights of family members of EC nationals are derivative in nature. Their existence 
depends  on  a  family  relation  to  an  EC  national  and  on  the  primary  beneficiary’s 
exercise of the right to move/migrate from one Member State to another.6 The general 
rule requires the presence of both conditions for the exercise of family members’ rights, 
having as its consequence the loss of these rights should either condition be non-existent 
or lost.7 However, as analysed further below, neither condition is absolute; rather, there 
are flexible solutions in cases that do not necessarily fulfil one of the two requirements. 
The  analysis  will  show  that  both  the  family  relation  condition  and  the 
4 Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279; Case 
C-257/00, Nani Givane and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] ECR I-00345; 
Case C-459/99, Mouvement contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v. État 
belge [2002] ECR I-6591.
5 Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Hacene Akrich [2001] ECR I-9607
6 Additionally, Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68 (n.3), providing for the right of family members of EC 
workers to install themselves with the worker, imposes a third requirement on the primary beneficiary, 
stipulating that he must make available to his family “housing considered normal for national workers in 
the region where he is employed”. 
7 Cremona, Citizens of Third Countries: Movement and Employment of Migrant Workers within the  
European Union, (1995) 2 Legal Issues of European Integration,p. 93.
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movement/migration condition may sometimes not be (fully) satisfied, and yet family 
members’ rights will nonetheless be protected by the Community. Such cases question 
the derivative nature of family members’ rights, and point the way to possible future 
developments in this area.
2.1. Family Relation as the First Condition
A family relation between the primary and secondary beneficiary is the first and most 
obvious condition required for family reunification rights to come into play. The type of 
family  relation  required,  i.e.  the  categories  of  a  primary  beneficiary’s  relatives 
encompassed by EC secondary legislation, will be identified below in the chapter on 
beneficiaries. Chapter 2.1. will deal only with cases that relativise the family relation 
condition, showing that the break-up or termination of a family bond need not always 
lead  to  the  loss  of  rights  arising  from family  reunification.  This  statement  will  be 
illustrated by two examples.  The first  case is  the separation or even divorce of the 
primary and secondary beneficiary, which does not preclude the continued existence of 
family members’ rights. This situation will be demonstrated by analysis of the following 
cases:  Diatta,8 Singh,9 and  Baumbast  and R.10 The second  case  is  the  death of  the 
primary beneficiary, which, again, does not affect the secondary beneficiary’s right to 
remain in the territory of the host Member State. This statement will be demonstrated by 
analysis of Regulation 1251/70 on the right of workers to remain in the territory of a 
Member State after having been employed in that State, and supported by the Court’s 
position in Nani Givane11.
a) Separation/Divorce of the Primary and Secondary Beneficiary
The case of separation or divorce of the primary and secondary beneficiary, which does 
not preclude the right to family reunification, will be illustrated by three cases: Diatta,12 
Singh,13 and  Baumbast  and R.14 Diatta15 and  Baumbast  and  R16 rely  on  Regulation 
1612/68/EEC on freedom of movement for workers within the Community as its legal 
basis,  while  Singh17 relies  on  Articles  39  and  43  of  the  EC  Treaty  and  Directive 
73/148/EEC on the  abolition  of  restrictions  on  movement  and residence  within  the 
Community  for  nationals  of  Member  States  with  regard  to  establishment  and  the 
provision of services. These cases set limits on the derivative nature of the rights of EC 
nationals’  family  members.  Diatta18 and  Singh19 question  the  prevailing  approach 
dominated  by  the  primary  beneficiary,  which  regards  the  rights  of  the  secondary 
8 Case 267/83, Diatta v. Land Berlin [1985] ECR 567.
9 Case C-370/90, R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [1992] ECR I-4265.
10 Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-07091.
11 Case C-257/00, Nani Givane and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] ECR I-
00345.
12 267/83 Diatta v. Land Berlin [1985] ECR 567.
13 Singh, see n.9
14 Baumbast and R, see n.10 
15 Diatta see n.8
16 Baumbast and R see n.10
17 Singh see n.9 
18 Diatta see n.8 
19 Singh see n. 9 
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beneficiary as a mere by-product of the primary beneficiary’s right to family life. They 
best illustrate a case in which the secondary beneficiary’s rights are preserved despite 
separation, though not yet divorce, from the primary beneficiary. On the other hand, the 
third case, Baumbast and R,20 shows that the right to family reunification can continue 
to exist despite the absolute termination of a marital relation by divorce.
The  first  two  cases,  Diatta21 and  Singh,22 show  that  rights  arising  from  family 
reunification can be exercised even if the spouses do not live together or are separated, 
as long as their marriage has not been officially terminated by the competent authority, 
i.e. as long as there has not been an official dissolution of the family bond.23 In both 
cases the  primary  and secondary beneficiary  were separated  but  not  (yet)  officially 
divorced. Ms. Diatta was married to a French national. Both were resident and working 
in  Berlin.  After  some  time,  she  separated  from  her  husband  with  the  intention  of 
divorcing him and started living in separate accommodation. Both spouses remained in 
Germany. The Court stated that the fact that the spouses were no longer living together 
(even though still officially married) did not preclude the secondary beneficiary’s right 
of  residence  and  employment  in  the  Member  State  where  the  primary  beneficiary 
resided,  based  on  Articles  10  and  11  of  the  Council  Regulation  on  freedom  of 
movement for workers within the Community.24 The Court reasoned that “in providing 
that a member of a migrant worker’s family has the right to install himself with the 
worker, Article 10 of the Regulation does not require that the member of the family in 
question must live permanently with the worker but, as is clear from Article 10(3),25 
only that the accommodation which the worker has available must be such as may be 
considered normal for the purpose of accommodating his family”.26 It stressed that “a 
requirement  that  the  family  must  live  under  the  same  roof  permanently  cannot  be 
implied”.27 The Court further elaborated that “such an interpretation corresponds to the 
spirit of Article 11 of the Regulation which gives the member of the family the right to 
take up any activity as an employed person throughout the territory of the Member State 
concerned, even though that activity is exercised at a place some distance from the place 
where the migrant worker resides” (emphasis added).28 It concluded that “the marital 
relationship cannot be regarded as dissolved so long as it has not been terminated by the 
competent authority”, clarifying that “it is not dissolved merely because the spouses live 
separately, even where they intend to divorce at a later date”.29 
In Diatta30 the Court seemed to follow the arguments provided by the plaintiff, stating 
that “it is not for the immigration authorities to decide whether a reconciliation is still 
20 Baumbast and R see n.10
21 Diatta see n. 8
22 Singh see n.9 
23 However, rights arising from family reunification do not apply to couples living together but not 
officially married (see Case 59/85 Netherlands v. Reed [1986] ECR 1283).
24 Regulation 1612/68 (n.3)
25 Article 10(3) of Regulation 1612/68 (n.3): “For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the worker must 
have available for his family housing considered normal for national workers in the region where he is 
employed; this provision, however, must not give rise to discrimination between national workers and 
workers from the other Member States.”
26 Diatta (n.8) para.18
27 Diatta (n.8) para.18
28 Diatta (n.8) para. 19
29 Diatta (n.8) para.20
30 Diatta n.8
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possible”.31 If  the  family  bond  has  not  been  broken,  the  conditions  for  family 
reunification still exist, and it can, therefore, still be argued that granting the right of 
residence to the secondary beneficiary merely has the function of protecting the primary 
beneficiary’s right to free movement and family life. On the other hand, Craig and de 
Burca rightly argue that “the Court was probably influenced by the argument made on 
behalf of Ms. Diatta that, if cohabitation was mandatory, a worker could at any moment 
cause the expulsion of a spouse by depriving that spouse of a roof”.32 In this respect, it 
could  be  maintained  that  the  Court  took  into  consideration  the  position  of  a  non-
Community  national,  i.e.  the  secondary beneficiary,  who was separated  but  not  yet 
divorced from the primary beneficiary, and who would otherwise have been left “at the 
mercy”  of the primary beneficiary’s  intention of keeping his spouse under the same 
roof. However, the Court’s arguments suggested that once the divorce proceedings were 
finalised, Ms. Diatta could no longer derive rights from Regulation 1612/68, and would 
thus face possible expulsion from the host Member State. One can, therefore, conclude 
that the Court would not be willing to consider Ms. Diatta’s rights separate from her 
husband’s rights to family reunification. The Court viewed Ms. Diatta’s interests only 
within the framework of family reunification, as a derivation of her spouse’s rights.
Regarding this line of thought, Weiler argues that the Court made a crucial mistake by 
not considering at all  whether an interpretation of Article 11 of Regulation 1612/68 
giving the primary beneficiary such power over the secondary beneficiary’s life, i.e. by 
divorce or threat of divorce leading to possible expulsion from the host Member State, 
represents a violation of the secondary beneficiary’s human rights, as was pleaded by 
both Ms. Diatta and the Commission (albeit only in the oral hearing).33 He notes that, 
even though Regulation 1612/68 states that a spouse loses the right of residence once a 
divorce is final, in the event of an alleged violation of fundamental human rights the 
Court must investigate  whether  the relevant  provision is  in conflict  with the human 
rights  norm.34 Should its  findings  be positive,  the Court  has  “either  to construe  the 
Community measure in such a way that it does not conflict with human rights norms… 
or to strike the Community measure down”.35 Weiler finds it acceptable that Ms. Diatta 
(or  any other  non-Community  spouse  of  an EC national)  would  lose her  derivative 
rights by divorce, but adds that having her lose protection of her fundamental human 
rights would make her “an instrumentality, a means to ensure the economic goal of free 
movement of all factors of production”.36 Read in this light, his arguments seem utterly 
convincing, and the path taken by the Court rather dangerous, if not incorrect. However, 
one must remember that the Court reached its decision in  Diatta37 two decades ago. 
Since then, its rulings have shown a willingness to take a more liberal approach and 
consider the changing and widening objectives of the original Treaty of Rome and the 
31 Diatta (n.8) para.10
32 Craig and de Burca, EU LAW – TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS , Oxford University Press, 2003,  p. 742.
33 Weiler, Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of Non-
EC Nationals – A Critique (1992) 3 EJIL p. 87.
34 Weiler (ibid., p. 88) provides two examples which would classify Ms. Diatta’s case as a violation of 
human rights. First, a situation in which a Community measure would empower the primary beneficiary 
to force his/her spouse to act under the threat of divorce and consequent expulsion could compromise the 
spouse’s right to human dignity. Second, a case in which the primary beneficiary gained custody over 
children, while the spouse’s relationship with the children was terminated via expulsion, could 
compromise the spouse’s right to family life.
35 Weiler, ibid., p. 87.
36 Weiler, ibid., p. 90.
37 Diatta, n.8
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extension  of  the  primary  ideology  of  market  freedoms  to  include  the  principle  of 
fundamental human rights. Recent decisions taken by the Court in Carpenter38 and, in 
particular,  Akrich39, as analysed below, suggest that the ECJ has changed its approach 
drastically  in  recent  family  reunification  cases,  to  the  benefit  of  the  protection  of 
fundamental  human rights,  by shifting the  emphasis  from free movement  to human 
rights issues. 
In Surrinder Singh,40 Mr. Singh, an Indian national, was married to a British national. 
They travelled  together  to  Germany,  where  both  of  them worked  for  several  years 
before returning to the UK in order to set up a business. Upon their return to the UK, 
Mr. Singh was granted a limited right of residence there, which was terminated by the 
immigration  authorities  after  Ms.  Singh  started  divorce  proceedings  against  her 
husband. In this case the Court went even further, granting the non-Community spouse 
of a UK national the right of residence arising from a family relation, despite the decree 
nisi of divorce pronounced against him in the divorce proceedings. The fact that the 
marriage  was later dissolved by a decree absolute of  divorce was,  according to the 
Court, “not relevant to the question referred for a preliminary ruling which concerns the 
basis of the right of residence of the person concerned during the period before the date 
of that decree”.41
The marital  situation in  Singh42 left  the Court  with less  room to  follow the narrow 
interpretation  it  formed  in  Diatta43 and  justify  the  existence  of  the  secondary 
beneficiary’s  right  of  residence  only  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  primary 
beneficiary’s right to free movement and family life. Here there was no doubt as to the 
endurance of the family relation in the future,  since the marriage had actually been 
dissolved at a date prior to the Court’s judgement. The possibility of later reconciliation 
of separated but not yet divorced spouses could not be used as an argument in protecting 
the  primary  beneficiary’s  right  to  free  movement.  Still,  the  judgement  in  Singh is 
concerned only  with  the  period prior  to  the  official  date  of  divorce,  i.e.  before  the 
decree absolute. The judgement preserves the primary beneficiary’s right to family life, 
as one of the conditions for the fulfilment of her right to free movement, but pertains 
only to the period before divorce. It can be argued that a family relation must exist at a 
point in time when a right to family reunification was disputed by one of the parties. It 
is not necessary that the family relation still exist at the time of the judgement. 
The above cases illustrate the endurance of rights arising from a family relation despite 
the  spouses’  separation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  third  case,  Baumbast  and  R,44 
demonstrates that these rights can continue to exist despite the absolute termination of a 
marital  relation  by divorce.  In  this  case,  the  Court  cited  a  different  legal  basis  for 
granting a Community migrant worker’s former spouse right of residence in the host 
Member State following their divorce. R was a non-EC national who had two children 
by her former husband, who was a French national working and residing in the United 
Kingdom. After several years of living together in the UK, R and her husband divorced. 






44 Baumbast and R, n.10
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No measures affecting her status were taken by the UK authorities at that time. The 
divorce settlement  provided that  the children were to reside with R in England and 
Wales for at least five years,  or such other time as agreed by the parties. They had 
regular contact with their father. When R and the children, under domestic law, applied 
for indefinite leave to remain in the UK, the UK authorities accepted the children’s 
application, but refused R’s. When the case came before the European Court of Justice 
through a preliminary ruling procedure, the Court decided that R’s right of residence in 
the UK stemmed from Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community, which provides right of access to educational courses to 
the children of a national of one Member State who is or has been employed in another 
Member State.45 In resolving the issue of R’s right of residence in the UK following her 
divorce from a Community migrant worker, the Court concluded that “where children 
have the right to reside in a host Member State in order to attend general educational 
courses  pursuant  to  Article  12  of  Regulation  No  1612/68,  that  provision  must  be 
interpreted as entitling the parent who is the primary carer of those children, irrespective 
of his nationality,  to reside with them in order to facilitate the exercise of that right 
notwithstanding the fact that the parents have meanwhile divorced or that the parent 
who has the status of citizen of the European Union has ceased to be a migrant worker 
in the host Member State” (emphasis added).46
The  Court’s  reasoning  in  Baumbast  and  R47 is  significantly  different  from  that  in 
Diatta48 and  Singh.49 With regard to this case, possible deviations from the derivative 
nature of a family member’s rights must be viewed from a different angle. First, the 
primary and secondary beneficiary were already divorced at the relevant point in time. 
The family relation condition was therefore terminated, and the secondary beneficiary 
faced the possibility of losing her right of residence in the host Member State, based on 
Regulation 1612/68.  Her  right  could no longer be protected as  a  component  of  the 
primary  beneficiary’s  right  to  free  movement.  Here,  the  right  of  another  group  of 
secondary beneficiaries – the children of the primary and secondary beneficiary – came 
into play, and had a crucial role in preserving the rights of the primary beneficiary’s 
former spouse. Her right of residence no longer derived from the primary beneficiary, 
but rather from their children’s right to education, which itself derived from the primary 
beneficiary’s  right  to  free  movement.  The  rights  of  the  former  spouse  were  still 
derivative in nature, and could be viewed as the third link in a chain consisting of the 
primary beneficiary and two groups of secondary beneficiaries. However, the direct link 
between the former spouse and the primary beneficiary had been broken, and the legal 
basis for her rights was different. In that respect, the rights of the former spouse served 
to  permit  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  education  of  another  group  of  secondary 
beneficiaries. Even though the indirect effect of the judgement was the preservation of 
the secondary beneficiary’s family life, it seems that the Court, similar to its  Diatta50 
judgement,  did  not  take  into  consideration  the  fundamental  human  rights  of  the 
45 Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 (n.3) states: “The children of a national of a Member State who is or 
has been employed in the territory of another Member State shall be admitted to that State’s general 
educational, apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same conditions as the nationals of 
that State, if such children are residing in its territory. Member States shall encourage all efforts to enable 
such children to attend these courses under the best possible conditions.”
46 Baumbast and R, (n.10),para. 75 
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secondary beneficiary,  i.e.  her  right  to  family  life.  Even though R submitted  that  a 
refusal to afford her the right of residence would be “a disproportionate interference 
with family life, contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,51 the Court did not consider this argument, 
basing its judgement entirely on the children’s right to education, and only indirectly 
conferring  the  right  of  residence  on  their  mother,  as  a  derivation  of  their  right  to 
education.  In  this  respect,  the  Court’s  reasoning  was  again  in  conflict  with  the 
suggestions made by Weiler with regard to Diatta.52
b) Primary Beneficiary’s Death
The second example of the flexibility of the family relation condition is provided by the 
case  of  the  primary  beneficiary’s  death,  which  does  not  preclude  the  secondary 
beneficiary’s right to remain in the territory of the host Member State. Here, the right of 
the spouse of a primary beneficiary to reside in the host Member State arises from their 
family  bond,  i.e.  family  reunification,  while  the  death  of  the  primary  beneficiary 
transforms the spouse’s derivative right into a right of his/her own. The legal basis here 
is different from the cases of separation/divorce between spouses analysed in the section 
above;  namely,  Regulation  1251/70/EEC  on  the  right  of  workers  to  remain  in  the 
territory of a Member State after  having been employed in that  State. According to 
Article 3 of Regulation 1251/70/EEC, the family members of a national of a Member 
State who has worked as an employed person in the territory of another Member State, 
having resided with him in the territory of the host Member State, are entitled to remain 
there permanently even after his death if the worker himself acquired the right to remain 
there, as specified in the Regulation.53 Should a worker die before having acquired the 
right  to  remain  in  the  territory  of  the  host  Member  State,  his  family  members  are 
entitled  to  remain  there  if  the  conditions  prescribed  by  the  Regulation  have  been 
fulfilled.54
In this situation, if the family member is the spouse of the primary beneficiary,55 the 
right to remain in the territory of a Member State persists despite the actual termination 
of the family bond, i.e. of marriage between the primary and secondary beneficiary. As 
51 Baumbast and R, (n.10),,para. 65 
52 Diatta,n.8 
53 According to Article 2 of Commission Reg.1251/70 [1970] OJ L 142/24, the primary beneficiary is 
entitled to remain permanently in the territory of another Member State if one of the following conditions 
is fulfilled: 1) he/she is entitled to an old-age pension and has been employed in that Member State for at 
least the last twelve months, and has resided there continuously for more than three years; or 2) he/she, 
having resided continuously in the territory of that Member State for more than two years, ceases to work 
there as a result of a permanent incapacity to work; or 3) he/she, after three years’ continuous 
employment and residence in the territory of that Member State, works as an employed person in the 
territory of another Member State, while retaining his/her residence in the territory of the first Member 
State to which he/she returns each day or at least once a week.
54 The conditions set by Article 3(2) of Regulation 1251/70 (n.53) are that “the worker on the date of his 
decease had resided continuously in the territory of that Member State for at least 2 years; or his death 
resulted from an accident at work or an occupational disease; or the surviving spouse is a national of the 
State of residence or lost the nationality of that State by marriage to that worker.”
55 According to Article 3 of Regulation 1251/70 (n.53), family members entitled to the right of residence 
after the primary beneficiary’s death include: the spouse, descendants of the primary beneficiary and 
his/her spouse under the age of 21 or dependants, and dependant relatives in an ascending line from the 
primary beneficiary and his/her spouse.
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the European Court of Justice has rightly stated in  Nani Givane, “the worker’s death 
transforms his family members’ right of residence into a right of their own”.56 Upon the 
primary beneficiary’s death, the nature of the spouse’s right changes from a derivative 
one into one attributed directly to him/her. By recognising the right of residence of a 
deceased  worker’s  family  member,  the  Community  has  opted  for  protection  of  the 
secondary beneficiary independently, despite the fact that the primary beneficiary has 
ceased to exist; however, only on the conditions57 set forth in Regulation 1271/70/EEC, 
where  the  element  of  the  continuity of  a  primary  beneficiary’s  employment  and 
residence  prevails.  As  the  Court  held  in  Nani  Givane,58 such  conditions  serve  to 
establish a “significant connection” (emphasis added) between that Member State and 
the worker and his family,  and “to ensure a certain level of their  integration in the 
society of that State” (emphasis added).59
Protection of the right of residence of family members of deceased EC nationals results 
from a broader Community policy reasoning in the area of the free movement of EC 
workers,  as  mentioned  previously.  First,  the  freedom of  movement  of  EC workers, 
according to  Article  39(3)(d)  of  the  EC Treaty,  entails  the  right  “to  remain  in  the 
territory  of  a  Member  State  after  having  been  employed  in  that  State,  subject  to 
conditions  which  shall  be  embodied  in  implementing  regulations”.  Regulation 
1251/70/EEC ensures that the right provided by Article 39(3)(d) of the EC Treaty is 
granted under the conditions specified within it. Second, the preamble of Regulation 
1251/70/EEC proclaims that “the exercise by the worker of the right to remain entails 
that such right shall be extended to members of his family”, and continues by adding 
that “in the case of the death of the worker during his working life, maintenance of the 
right of residence of the members of his family must also be recognised and be the 
subject of special conditions”. The reasoning supporting extension of an EC worker’s 
right to remain to his/her family members is that EC workers’ freedom of movement 
cannot be exercised unless it is also granted to their family members. This has been 
recognised by both Community legislation60 and the European Court of Justice’s case-
law.61 However,  the fact that the right to remain also applies to family members of 
deceased EC workers is more than just an embodiment of the free movement principle. 
It  ensures the protection of the family life of Member States’  nationals  per se,  and 
shields the interests of the worker and his/her family members. 
To conclude, the preceding sections distinguish between two situations. The first is the 
case of separation/divorce of the primary and secondary beneficiary. The second is the 
case of the death of the primary beneficiary. Both situations show the relative nature of 
the family relation condition generally required for family reunification to come into 
effect. These two situations demonstrate that the break-up or termination of a family 
relation  need  not  always  preclude  the  granting  of  rights  arising  from  family 
56 Paragraph 31 of case C-257/00, Nani Givane and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2003] ECR I-00345.
57 For the list of conditions, see n. 54.
58 Case C-257/00 ,Nani Givane and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] ECR I-
00345.
59 Ibid. para. 45
60 E.g. the preamble to the Directive on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons 
who have ceased their occupational activity (90/365,EEC) and the preamble to the Directive on the right 
of residence (90/364/EEC), stating that the right of residence “can only be genuinely exercised if it is also 
granted to the members of the family”.
61 Diatta (n.8) para.13; Singh (n.9) para.19,20; Nani Givane (n.58) para.45
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reunification. In the first situation, i.e. separation/divorce, the secondary beneficiary’s 
rights  are  interpreted as  broadly  as  possible,  but  only  within  the  framework of  the 
primary  beneficiary’s  rights.  In  Diatta,62 Singh63 and  Baumbast  and  R,64 the  cases 
analysed within the first situation, the Court never questioned the derivative nature of 
secondary  beneficiary’s  rights,  and  never  actually  went  beyond  the  wording  of  the 
relevant  provisions.  One  could maintain,  with considerable  certainty,  that  the  Court 
would not have granted rights arising from family reunification had Ms. Diatta or Mr. 
Singh already been officially divorced from their Community national spouses at the 
relevant time, or if R. had had no children by her former husband to take care of as their 
primary carer. The second situation, i.e. the death of the primary beneficiary, goes much 
further in proving the relativity of the family relation condition, and boldly transforms 
the  secondary  beneficiary’s  rights  from  derivative  into  independent  ones.  In  this 
situation,  the  secondary beneficiary’s  rights  are  no  longer  perceived as  a  mere  by-
product  of  the  primary  beneficiary’s  right  to  free  movement,  but  are,  significantly, 
approached  as  independent  rights  of  the  secondary  beneficiary.  Such  a  distinction 
between these two situations is understandable, considering the fact that the latter is 
regulated by Community secondary legislation, thus leaving the Court in a position of 
not  having to tread new ground and play a  partisan role in  extending the rights  of 
secondary beneficiaries. In contrast, separation/divorce cases require the Court to play 
exactly this role, reading Community provisions in a flexible manner if more rights than 
are stipulated are to be granted.
2.2. Cross-Border  Movement/Migration  of  the  Primary  Beneficiary  as  the 
Second Condition
The second condition for the existence of the rights of family members is the primary 
beneficiary’s exercise of the right to move/migrate from one Member State to another. 
Unlike the first condition, this one is not self-evident, and requires an explanation that 
would either support or dispute its justification. This chapter will try to identify the legal 
foundations and reasoning behind this rule, at the same time illustrating the practical 
implications of the cross-border movement condition by means of a number of cases, 
which  will  be analysed  in  the  order  of  their  appearance and finalisation before  the 
European Court of Justice. It will determine the scope of the cross-border movement 
condition by looking at cases that have triggered the application of Community law, as 
well as those that were judged to fall outside its reach. The historical development and 
the ECJ’s evolving attitudes as to what constitutes a wholly internal situation will be 
discussed, with a special emphasis on reverse discrimination, its causes, and possible 
ways of resolving it. 
This  chapter  will  illustrate  the  growing  importance  of  human  rights  in  family 
reunification cases, which has evolved parallel to a general shift of emphasis in the area 
of the free movement of persons, from its perception as an economic to a civil and 
social  right.  The  case  analysis  will  show  that  the  initial  perception  of  family 
reunification as an expression of the social dimension of the free movement principle 
has subsequently evolved: first, towards the full recognition of the family life of EC 
62 Diatta,n.8  
63 Singh,n.9 
64 Baumbast and R , n.10
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nationals as a human right,65 and, later, towards an acknowledgement of family life as 
the legal basis for family reunification in cases where cross-border movement has taken 
place but  cannot be used for the application of Community law.66 Recent European 
Court  of  Justice  case-law  questions  the  future  development  of  the  cross-border 
movement condition, which seems to be slowly becoming redundant and outdated as the 
European integration process moves on.
The ECJ first  ruled out  the  application  of  family  reunification  rights  in  a  situation 
lacking cross-border movement in the early case Morson and Jhanjan.67 Here, the Court 
held that the non-Community (Surinamese) parents of two Dutch nationals working and 
residing in the Netherlands were not entitled to stay in the country with their children 
and enjoy the benefits of Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68/EEC. The Court supported 
its decision by stating that  the Dutch nationals had not exercised their  right  to  free 
movement, since they were both residing and working in the Netherlands.68 Since there 
was  no  cross-border  movement,  the  situation  lacked  any  factor  connecting  it  to 
Community law,69 and was classified as a wholly internal situation. This reasoning was 
confirmed in the subsequent joint cases  Uecker and Jacquet.70 These cases concerned 
two third-country nationals who tried to make use of Community law as the spouses of 
German nationals residing and working in Germany: Ms. Uecker was Norwegian and 
Ms. Jacquet was Russian. Both of them came to Germany to live with their husbands, 
neither of whom had worked outside Germany at the material time. Both wives were 
employed  at  German  universities,  but  obtained  only  short-term contracts  with  their 
employers.  They  sought  to  rely  on  Articles  7  and  11  of  Regulation  1612/68/EEC, 
claiming equal treatment with German nationals in employment. The ECJ again ruled 
that  Community  law could  not  be  applied  to  the  situation of  Ms.  Uecker  and Ms. 
Jacquet, since the right to free movement had not been exercised. The Court continued 
by stating that “citizenship of the Union, established by Article 8 of the EC Treaty, is 
not intended to extend the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty also to internal situations 
which have no link with Community law”.71 This  statement  explicitly  excludes any 
possibility  of  a  different  interpretation  of  wholly  internal  situations  in  view of  the 
creation of EU citizenship by the Treaty of Maastricht.
These two cases illustrate several points. First,  neither in 1982 nor in 1997 was the 
European Court of Justice willing to interfere in situations that were regarded as purely 
or wholly internal.72 As Tillotson and Foster noted, it could be even argued that the 
65 Carpenter n.38; Nani Givane n.11; Case C-459/99 Mouvement contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la  
xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v. État belge [2002] ECR I-6591.
66 Akrich n.5
67 Cases 35 & 36/82, Morson and Jhanjan v. Netherlands [1982] ECR 3723.
68 Ibid.,para.17 
69 Ibid.,para.16
70 Cases C-64 & 65/96, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Kari Uecker and Vera Jacquet [1997] ECR I-3171.
71 Ibid.,para.23 
72 Maduro (see Maduro, WE THE COURT ,Hart Publishing, 1998, p. 154) defines a purely internal situation 
as one “not falling within the scope of Community law”, and states that the connection of a particular fact 
with the Community’s legal order can be ascertained based on two main criteria: the degree of legal 
integration, and the existence of a link with another Member State or the exercise of free movement. 
Cannizzaro (Cannizzaro, PRODUCING ‘REVERSE DISCRIMINATION’ THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF EC COMPETENCES, 
YEL, 1997, p. 32) defines a purely internal situation as one “governed by national law falling outside the 
field of application of EC law”, explaining that this term “is meant to imply unrestricted freedom of 
Member States to regulate at their pleasure situations of no relevance to the realization of the objectives 
of the Community”.
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Court should refuse to accept references from national courts when dealing with internal 
situations, since a reference under Article 234 can only be made when Community law 
applies.73 Second, had the EC-national children in Morson and Jhanjan or the husbands 
in  Uecker and Jacquet been migrant  workers,  they would have been entitled to the 
protection afforded by Regulation 1612/68/EEC, and their family members would have 
been  granted  rights  thereunder.  Thus,  a  wholly  internal  situation  leads  to  reverse 
discrimination, where citizens of a host Member State cannot enjoy the more favourable 
treatment afforded by Community law in situations where EC nationals have exercised 
cross-border movement.  Or, to put it  the other way round, reverse discrimination is 
possible only in purely internal situations, while in situations regulated by Community 
law, reverse discrimination would be prohibited by the ECJ.74 Although conscious of the 
negative effects of reverse discrimination, the Court has refused to intervene in wholly 
internal situations, and has thus created anomalies. Some authors have offered different 
explanations  of  the  ECJ’s  motivation  for  non-intervention  in  cases  of  reverse 
discrimination.  Nic Shuibhne notes that  this  has been conceived as an “unusual  but 
inevitable  and  acceptable  corollary  of  non-interference  by  the  Community  in  the 
internal affairs of the Member States”.75 Similarly, Weatherill and Baumont suggest that 
the ECJ sought to avoid undue interference in the internal affairs of a Member State, 
adding that “the problem of reverse discrimination is unlikely to be serious, since a state 
has little incentive to discriminate against its own nationals”.76 However, they all agree 
that  the  reasoning  behind the  purely  internal  situation ceases  to  make  sense  as  the 
process of European integration proceeds, a point that will be discussed further below. 
Thirdly,  as  Cremona,77 Johnson&O’Keeffe78 and Nic Shuibhne79 correctly  point  out, 
Morson and Jhanjan and  Uecker and Jacquet illustrate that  the primary beneficiary 
must  not  only  be  entitled  to  the  right  of  free  movement,  but  must  have  actually 
exercised  it  in  order  for  Community  law to  come into  play.  This  point  was  to  be 
developed further in Surinder Singh.80 The final remark that can be made based on these 
two cases is that EU citizenship, as instituted by the Treaty of Maastricht, does not 
create the previously lacking link between wholly internal situations and the application 
of Community law, as the Court explicitly stated in Uecker and Jacquet.81
Surinder  Singh82 sheds  new  light  on  the  cross-border  movement  condition,  and 
represents a turning point in the ECJ’s treatment of a wholly internal rule in family 
reunification matters.  The facts of the case have already been presented above. The 
British authorities argued that Mr. Singh’s right to re-enter and reside in the UK derived 
from national law. The ECJ, however, held that the period of the British national’s work 
in another Member State enabled her spouse to rely on Community law and claim the 
73 Tillotson and Foster, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW , Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, 2003, p. 342.
74 Maduro, WE THE COURT, Hart Publishing, 1998, p. 154.
75 N. Shuibhne, Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?, (2002) 39 
CMLRev. p. 731.
76 Weatherill and Beaumont, EU LAW, Penguin, 1999, p. 714.
77 Cremona, see n. 7
78 Johnson&O’Keeffe: From Discrimination to Obstacles to Free Movement: Recent Developments  
Concerning the Free Movement of Workers 1989-1994, (1994) 31 CMLRev. p. 1339.
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rights stipulated under Community secondary legislation.83 It based its judgement on the 
statement that “a national of a Member State might be deterred from leaving his country 
of origin in order  to pursue an activity  as an employed  or self-employed person as 
envisaged by the Treaty in the territory of another Member State if, on returning to the 
Member  State  of  which he  is  a  national  in  order  to  pursue an  activity  there  as  an 
employed or self-employed person, the conditions of his entry and residence were not at 
least equivalent to those which he would enjoy under the Treaty or secondary law in the 
territory of another Member State”.84 The Court further elaborated that deterrence would 
have been evident if the EC national’s “spouse and children were not also permitted to 
enter and reside in the territory of his Member State of origin under conditions at least 
equivalent to those granted them by Community law in the territory of another Member 
State”.85 As Barrett notes, it is strange to argue that an individual will be deterred from 
going to another Member State because the conditions in that state are better than in the 
individual’s home state, but acknowledges possible deterrence from going back to one’s 
home state if one could not enjoy the same benefits, upon returning, as in the other 
Member  State,  which  would  obviously  harm  the  exercise  of  one’s  right  to  free 
movement within the common market.86
The Court’s decision in  Singh is clearly important, since it limits the application of a 
wholly internal rule, consequently broadening the reach of Community law as well as 
extending,  if  not  bending,  interpretation  of  the  cross-border  movement  rule.  While 
Tillotson and Foster87 refer to this case as an example of the “softening of the wholly 
internal rule”, Nic Shuibhne88 suggests that Singh is the first case in the field of family 
reunification matters to leave “a door ajar” for Community law to come into play. The 
Court based its judgement on both Articles 39 (free movement of workers) and 43 (right 
of establishment) of the EC Treaty, due to the fact that Ms. Singh exercised her right of 
free movement as a worker while in Germany, within the meaning of Article 39 of the 
EC Treaty, and returned to the UK to establish herself as a self-employed person, within 
the meaning of Article 43 of the EC Treaty. Craig & de Burca89 and Nic Shuibhne90 
point  out  the  ambiguity  regarding  whether  Community  rights  would  have  equally 
applied had Ms. Singh not been able to rely on Article 43 of the EC Treaty, i.e. had she 
not performed an economic activity as a self-employed person after re-entering the UK. 
The Court did not address this issue at all, but rather used both Articles 39 and 43 in its 
argumentation. Due to the fact that the Court’s judgement was based on a completely 
different  argumentation,  namely,  on  the  satisfaction  of  the  cross-border  movement 
requirement, one could argue that the issue of the performance of an economic activity 
upon return  to  the  host  Member  State  was  not  important  in  this  case,  and that  the 
decision would have been the same had Ms. Singh returned to the UK as a worker or 
even without performing any economic activity in the UK at all. 
83 Singh (n.9),article 21 of the judgement. Cremona (Cremona, Citizens of Third Countries: Movement  
and Employment of Migrant Workers within the European Union, (1995) 2 Legal Issues of European 
Integration, p. 93.) points out that Singh demonstrates that, once a primary beneficiary has exercised the 
right of free movement, the right will apply even against his/her home state.
84 Singh (n.9),para.19  
85 Singh (n.9),para.20 
86 Barrett, Family Matters: European Community Law and Third-Country Family Members, (2003) 40 
CMLRev. p. 379.
87 Tillotson and Foster, see n.73,p. 343.
88 Shuibhne, see n.75 p. 744.
89 Craig and de Burca, see n.32, p. 743.
90 Shuibhne, see n.75, p. 745.
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In any case, the decision in  Singh introduced a rule whereby, in situations that might 
look purely  internal  at  first  glance,  an  EC national  could trigger  the  application  of 
Community law to his right to family reunification by means of a prior cross-border 
movement. The ruling in  Singh created a way for EC nationals to invoke Community 
protection for their third-country national family members, by exercising their right to 
free movement to another Member State as workers and returning to their home state. 
Significantly,  the  facts  in  Singh suggested  that  the  non-Community  family  member 
needed to  take part  in  the  cross-border  movement,  an interpretation  that  was  to  be 
dismissed by the later cases analysed below, leading to an even more drastic shrinking 
of the wholly internal rule.91 The prior movement rule was invoked by the parties in 
these later cases before the ECJ, and it was reiterated by the Court and applied to similar 
situations.92 
Before moving on to the next case, Carpenter,93 which represents a further step in the 
narrowing of the wholly internal rule and the cross-border movement condition, one 
needs to consider its different legal basis compared to the previously analysed cases. 
Carpenter deals with the free movement of services (and not workers), and is therefore 
based on Article 49 of the EC Treaty and Community secondary legislation in this area. 
It will nevertheless be discussed in this chapter along with relevant cases on the free 
movement of workers, since it  forms a substantive unity with other cases on family 
reunification of EC nationals.
In Carpenter, a third-country (Philippine) national claimed the right of residence in the 
UK with her British spouse on the grounds that he provided services in other Member 
States from time to time. Ms. Carpenter maintained that “since her husband’s business 
required him to travel around in other Member States providing and receiving services, 
he could do so more easily as she was looking after his children from his first marriage, 
so  that  her  deportation  would  restrict  her  husband’s  right  to  provide  and  receive 
services”.94 The UK immigration authorities, on the other hand, held that Mr. Carpenter 
was entitled to be accompanied by his spouse when travelling to other Member States to 
provide services, but while he was resident in the UK he could not be considered to be 
exercising any freedom of movement within the meaning of Community law.95 The UK 
argument  was  therefore  based  on  the  wholly  internal  rule,  while  Ms.  Carpenter 
maintained  her  claim  was  encompassed  by  Community  legislation  on  the  free 
movement of services. The ECJ was faced with two questions. First, whether the spouse 
of an EC national who is established in one Member State and provides services in other 
Member States has the right to reside with him in the spouse’s Member State of origin. 
Second,  whether  the  fact  that  the  EC  national’s  spouse  is  performing  childcare 
indirectly  assists  the  EC  national  in  providing  services,  and  therefore  changes  the 
answer to the first question.96 The Court first eliminated the application of Directive 
73/148/EEC,97 as  the  relevant  Community  legislation  determining  the  right  to  free 
91 Carpenter n.38
92 Carpenter n.38;Akrich n.5
93 Carpenter n.38
94 Ibid., para.17 
95 Ibid., para. 18
96 Ibid.,para.20
97 Council Dir.73/148 [1973] OJ L 172/14 of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement 
and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to the establishment and 
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movement  of  EC national  service  providers  and  their  family  members.  It  correctly 
stated that the Directive governs the conditions under which an EC national service 
provider and his family members may leave that national’s Member State and enter and 
reside in another Member State; it does not govern the right of residence of his family 
in  his  Member  State  of  origin.98 The  Court  then  moved  on  to  an  analysis  of  the 
application of Article 4999 of the EC Treaty to the facts of this case. It first established 
that “the separation of Mr. and Ms. Carpenter would be detrimental to their family life 
and, therefore, to the conditions under which Mr. Carpenter exercises a fundamental 
freedom”, and concluded by saying that “that freedom could not be fully effective if Mr. 
Carpenter were to be deterred from exercising it by obstacles raised in his country of 
origin to the entry and residence of  his spouse”.100 Ms.  Carpenter’s  residence right, 
therefore,  indirectly  derived  from  the  Treaty  provision  on  the  free  movement  of 
services.
The reasoning of the European Court of Justice in  Carpenter raises several points for 
discussion.  It  does  not  simply  follow the  principle  established  in  Singh,  but  rather 
moves it to a new level by accepting two crucial elements that distinguish the situation 
in Carpenter from that in Singh. The first is that Carpenter concerns the free movement 
of services, not workers. The second is that Ms. Carpenter, unlike Ms. Singh, did not 
travel with Mr. Carpenter to the other Member States where he provided services, but 
instead stayed in Mr. Carpenter’s state of origin and took care of his children. These two 
distinguishing factors accumulatively shed new light on the cross-border movement rule 
(at least with regard to services) by adjusting it to a situation like that in Carpenter. The 
Court  decided that  Ms.  Carpenter  was entitled to reside in Mr.  Carpenter’s  state of 
origin, and not in the other Member State where he provided services.  This is  why 
Directive  73/148/EEC could not  be  applied,  and recourse  was  directly  made to  the 
Treaty  provision.  In  this  respect,  it  was  crucial  that  Ms.  Carpenter’s  activities 
(childcare) conditioned Mr. Carpenter’s ability to travel to other Member States and 
provide services there, to the extent that precluding Ms. Carpenter’s right would deter 
Mr. Carpenter from the exercise of his fundamental freedom.101 Therefore, in a situation 
such as this, the cross-border movement condition is still effective, but there must also 
be a link between the activities performed by the non-Community family member and 
the  effective  exercise  of  the  fundamental  freedom  to  provide  services  by  the  EC 
national, to the extent that precluding the right to family reunification would constitute a 
deterrence to the exercise of the EC national’s fundamental freedom.102 This implies 
that if Mr. Carpenter had had no children for Ms. Carpenter to look after, the opposite 
judgement would have been made. In Carpenter, the Court again limited the scope of 
the wholly internal rule, and slightly modified the cross-border movement condition in 
cases where only an EC national moves,  while his spouse’s  activity enables him to 
exercise his fundamental freedom.
provisions of services.
98 Carpenter (n.38),para.35,36
99 Article 49(1) of the EC Treaty states that “restrictions on freedom to provide services within the 
Community shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of 
the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended”.
100 Carpenter (n.38),para.39 
101 Ibid.
102 Shuibhne (see n.75, p. 760) calls this “the notion of deterrence”, meaning that the Court’s decision 
hinges on the second question posed to the Court, i.e. whether the non-national spouse indirectly assists 
the EC national in providing services in other Member States by carrying out childcare.
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It is questionable whether this new, softened cross-border movement rule would apply 
equally to cases of the free movement of workers and establishment. So far, Community 
secondary legislation in the area of the free movement of workers and cases before the 
ECJ  have  made  it  clear  that  family  reunification  rights  apply  only  when  a  non-
Community family member moves  together with an EC national to another Member 
State. However, what would happen if Mr. Carpenter moved to another Member State 
as a worker, while his non-Community spouse stayed in his state of origin to take care 
of his children from his first marriage? Would the same logic then apply, leading Ms. 
Carpenter’s right of residence to be indirectly derived from Article 39 of the EC Treaty 
stipulating the  free movement  of  workers?103 Similarly,  would it  apply to  a  case in 
which Mr. Carpenter was self-established in a Member State other than his state of 
origin, while Ms. Carpenter took care of his children in his home state? One could argue 
that the judgement in  Carpenter could not be transferred to a situation in which Mr. 
Carpenter was a worker or a self-established person in another Member State. Unlike 
services, which are of a temporary character, work and establishment imply a link with 
another Member State on a continuous and more permanent basis, which could thus 
lead to the conclusion that Mr. Carpenter, being a worker or a self-established person, 
voluntarily caused harm to his family life by moving to another Member State on a 
permanent basis, while leaving his wife and children back home instead of taking them 
with him. On the other hand, one could think of a number of situations that would this 
call this reasoning into question. For example, what if Mr. Carpenter travelled home 
every weekend, and had decided not to take his family with him to the other Member 
State so as not to interrupt his children’s schooling? Would it then matter that work and 
establishment are of a different nature than services? And, most importantly, would the 
fact  that  Mr.  Carpenter  travelled  to  the  other  Member  State  as  a  worker  or  a  self-
established person nullify the detrimental effect that Ms. Carpenter’s deportation would 
have on his exercise of a fundamental freedom? Essentially, no. Bearing this in mind, 
there are grounds for believing that the Court might reach the same conclusion in a 
situation where Mr. Carpenter moved to the other Member State as a worker or a self-
established  person.  Whichever  arguments  we  accept  as  valid,  however,  only  future 
judgements by the ECJ will resolve the issues raised by Carpenter.
Further questions arise with the direct application of Treaty provisions (not secondary 
legislation) to cases of family reunification. Who can be the addressees of the right to 
family reunification in cases such as Carpenter, where Treaty provisions apply directly 
– are they the same or different than the category defined by the relevant secondary 
legislation?104 As long as there is no direction provided by the ECJ’s case-law to prove 
otherwise, it seems reasonable to presume that the addressees are the same as in the 
relevant secondary legislation.
Finally, some authors have, in this context, drawn attention to the more extensive nature 
of services, as compared to work and establishment.105 While situations in which an EC 
national engages in an economic activity in another Member State, or provides services 
while being physically present there, seem to be more easily discernible and limited to a 
103 Again, the application of Community secondary legislation in the field of free movement of workers 
would have to be eliminated since, according to Article 10 of Council Reg. 1612/68 (n.3), it specifically 
applies to cases where the non-Community family member wants to install himself together with the EC 
national worker in the territory of a Member State other than the latter’s state of nationality.
104 Barrett, see n. 86, p. 407.
105 Shuibhne, see n.75, p.758 ; Barrett, see n.86, p.407; Tillotson and Foster, see n.73, p.345
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specific group of EC nationals, there are two other situations that must be taken into 
consideration. The first is where an EC national provides services in another Member 
State  without  any  physical  movement.  Here  it  is  the  service  itself  that  crosses  the 
border,  thus  eliminating  the  wholly  internal  situation.  Second,  the  Court  long  ago 
established that Article 49 also covers situations where the recipient of services travels 
to another Member State  in  order  to receive services there.  One can establish with 
certainty that such situations are numerous and, if family reunification rights for the 
service recipients are implied, they could cover almost all EC nationals. Tillotson and 
Foster wonder whether it is necessary for rights to fall under the heading of engaging in 
an economic activity in order to trigger the application of Community law and eliminate 
wholly internal situations.106 The test of engagement in an economic activity might be a 
good way to  draw a  line  between situations  (in  the  area  of  the  free  movement  of 
services) that fall within a wholly internal situation and those that invoke the family 
reunification rights of EC nationals under Community law. If not, then simply receiving 
services would trigger the application of Community law and guarantee residence rights 
to family members, overruling national laws.
To conclude, looking generally at the family reunification cases presented above, the 
Court’s  wording  in  Carpenter,107 Nani  Givane,108 and  MRAX109 suggests  that  the 
protection of the family life of EC nationals recognised by Community legislation in 
this area is still  viewed within the context of the free movement principle.  Thus, in 
Carpenter110 the Court  stated that  “…it  should be  remembered  that  the Community 
legislature has recognised the importance of ensuring the protection of the family life of 
nationals of the Member State in order to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, as is particularly apparent from the 
provisions of the Council regulations and directives on the freedom of movement of 
employed  and self-employed  workers  within  the  Community”.  The  Court  took into 
consideration Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 
guaranteeing the right to respect for family life, but the overall judgement placed the 
right to respect for family life in the context of an interpretation of the free movement of 
services  stipulated  by  Article  49  of  the  EC  Treaty.111 Akrich,112 the  most  recent 
judgement in this area, significantly changed this approach.
In Akrich113 the Court hinged application of the cross-border movement rule on another 
condition.  A  non-Community  national  would  be  entitled  to  the  Community  rights 
provided for in Regulation 1612/68 on the freedom of movement of workers within the 
Community, only if he/she had, before moving to another Member State with an EC 
national, resided lawfully on the territory of the first Member State to which he/she was 
returning. The facts of the case are as follows: Mr. Akrich, a Moroccan citizen, was 
residing unlawfully  in  the UK when he  married a  British  citizen in June 1996 and 
applied for leave to remain in the UK as her spouse. At the beginning of 1997 Mr. 
106 Tillotson and Foster, see n. 73, p. 345.
107 Carpenter n.38
108 Nani Givane (n. 58) para.45 
109 Case C-459/99 Mouvement contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v. État 
belge [2002] ECR I-6591, para.53
110 Carpenter (n.38),para.38 
111 Ibid.,para. 41-46 
112 Akrich, n.5
113 Ibid.
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Akrich was detained under the British Immigration Act and later, in accordance with his 
wishes, deported to Dublin, where his spouse had previously established herself. At the 
beginning of 1998, Mr. Akrich applied for a revocation of his deportation order and 
entry clearance as the spouse of a person settled in the UK. Ms. Akrich was offered 
employment in the UK commencing in August 1998. When interviewed by the British 
authorities in Dublin, Ms. Akrich said that her husband was applying for entry clearance 
based on the decision in Singh. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal referred the matter to 
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The Court basically had to decide whether Mr. Akrich 
could be granted entry to the UK and, if so, on what grounds, taking into consideration 
the fact that he was initially residing there unlawfully, and that the couple had moved to 
another Member State with the intention of returning to the UK by claiming the benefit 
of Community law. 
In its ruling, the ECJ first stated that,  in order to be able to benefit from the rights 
provided for in Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68, “a national of a non-Member State 
married to a citizen of the Union must be lawfully resident in a Member State when he 
moves to another Member State to which the citizen of the Union is migrating or has 
migrated”.114 It then continued by stating that Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68 applies 
only where the marriage is genuine, and that the intention of the spouses when installing 
themselves in another Member State is not relevant to the assessment  of their  legal 
situation.115 Finally  and most  significantly,  the  Court  concluded by stating that  in  a 
situation  where  Article  10  of  Regulation  1612/68  does  not  apply  due  to  unlawful 
residence in the Member State’s territory,  the competent  authorities of that Member 
State “must nonetheless have regard to the right to respect for family life under Article 8 
of  the  European  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human Rights  and  Fundamental 
Freedoms”.116
One  thing  is  evident  from  this  case:  once  a  non-Community  national  has  resided 
illegally in one Member State, cross-border movement cannot change his/her residence 
status  from  illegal  to  legal.  Consequently,  illegal  residence  status  precludes  the 
application  of  Community  law  on  free  movement  (both  the  Treaty  provisions  and 
secondary legislation) to this case. However, Mr. Akrich seems to be entitled to stay in 
the Member State on a completely different legal basis – the right to family life under 
Article 8 of the ECHR. Judging by the formulation used by the Court  (“must have 
regard” to the right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the ECHR), there is no 
set obligation for the national court to base its judgement on Article 8 of the ECHR. The 
ECJ is simply pointing the national court in the right direction by obliging it to take 
Article  8  of  the  ECHR into  consideration.  Despite  such  a  formulation,  which  only 
obliges the national court to have regard to Article 8 of the ECHR, but not to actually 
apply it, this judgement carries a great deal of weight. It hardly seems imaginable that a 
national  court  would  not  actually  apply  the  right  to  respect  for  family  life  and, 
consequently, deny Mr. Akrich the right to enter the UK. What, then, is the legal basis 
of the judgement in  Akrich? Does it rely on Article 8 of the ECHR, as another legal 
system outside its jurisdiction, or on something else? The right to respect for family life 
is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR, and these in turn constitute 
114 Akrich, (n.5),para.61, first indent 
115 Akrich, (n.5),para.61, second and third indent 
116 Akrich, (n.5),para. 61, fourth indent 
For citation please use CYELP, volume 1. More information available at www.cyelp.com
the general principles of EC law.117 In this context, one can assert that the ECJ has taken 
the general principles of EC law as its legal basis in Akrich.
The judgement in  Akrich is revolutionary, since it obliges a national court to take the 
right to family life into consideration, at  the same time acknowledging the fact that 
Community law on free movement does not apply at all. Can we, therefore, assume that 
cross-border movement is of no relevance to the Court’s decision in Akrich, or is it still 
a requirement despite the non-reliance on Community provisions on free movement? 
Would the judgement have been the same if Mr. and Ms. Akrich had not travelled to 
another Member State at all, but had remained in Ms. Akrich’s state of origin? If so, one 
could deduce that Akrich has indirectly abandoned the wholly internal situation rule to 
the  benefit  of  fundamental  rights.  Even  though  the  Court  in  Akrich does  not  say 
anything  explicitly,  it  seems  to  suggest  that  cross-border  movement  is  still  a 
requirement, no longer for the application of Community legislation on free movement, 
but instead for the general principles of EC law. Cross-border movement can be seen as 
a key element giving the ECJ jurisdiction to rule in this case. One could conclude that 
fundamental rights have still not entirely replaced the cross-border movement condition 
in  Akrich. On the contrary, the two seem to complement each other. Will future ECJ 
case-law go further  in this direction, replacing the cross-border movement condition 
entirely with fundamental rights? The trend we have witnessed so far definitely suggests 
this.  In any case,  recent judgements  show that  the internal  situation rule leading to 
reverse discrimination is slowly softening, and even vanishing. Akrich could be seen as 
the culminating point of this trend.
Finally, one could draw a parallel between the notion of the right to respect for family 
life,  as  a  fundamental  right  that  provides  a  safe  haven  for  family  members  of  EC 
nationals not encompassed by Community law on free movement,  and the notion of 
citizenship as the umbrella category for all EC nationals’ rights. However, two points 
need to be made here. First, as mentioned previously, EU citizenship does not resolve 
the paradox of purely internal  situations,118 and so far (according to the situation in 
Akrich) it seems that the right to respect for family life as a fundamental right does not, 
either. Second, despite the possible parallel between the two notions, citizenship can 
easily be perceived as a dividing line strictly separating EC nationals from third-country 
nationals.  It  seems  difficult  to  prevent  EU  citizenship  from  becoming  a  means  of 
excluding third-country nationals from living in the Union.  In this light,  association 
agreements,  such  as  the  Europe  Agreements  and  Stabilisation  and  Association 
Agreements, and the policy of family reunification can be viewed as system of bridging 
this divide, but only in the narrow group of situations prescribed therein. 
3. Beneficiaries
117 Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty stipulates that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed 
by the ECHR and derived from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as the general 
principles of Community law. 
118 Cases C-64 & 65/96, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Kari Uecker and Vera Jacquet [1997] ECR I-3171, 
paragraph 23: “citizenship of the Union, established by Article 8 of the EC Treaty, is not intended to 
extend the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty also to internal situations which have no link with 
Community law”.
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Before  identifying  which  family  members  are  beneficiaries  of  the  rights  to  family 
reunification granted under EC secondary legislation, it is necessary to define the term 
“beneficiaries”  and  understand  to  whom it  refers.  As  already  explained  above,  the 
derivative nature of the rights of family members of EC nationals creates two lines of 
beneficiaries of such rights, depending on the angle from which these rights are viewed. 
On the one hand, there are the EC nationals from whom their family members’ rights 
derive (primary beneficiaries). There is nothing derivative about primary beneficiaries’ 
rights to free movement and family life. Primary beneficiaries are those whose right to 
family life is protected under law, and would be violated by deterring a family member 
from residing with them. On the other hand, the rights of family members do not exist 
in  and of  themselves,  and  so  they  can  be  regarded  as  indirect  beneficiaries  of  the 
primary beneficiaries’ rights to free movement and family life (secondary beneficiaries). 
The rights arising from family reunification apply regardless of the nationality of the 
secondary  beneficiary;  he/she  can  be  any  third-country  national.  This  chapter  will 
mostly  deal  with  secondary  beneficiaries.  However,  since  the  rights  of  secondary 
beneficiaries  would  not  exist  without  the  rights  of  primary  beneficiaries,  it  is  first 
necessary to identify possible primary beneficiaries. In the case of a non-Community 
national related to an EC national, the primary beneficiary can be an EC national who is 
a worker,119 a provider or recipient of services,  a self-established person,120 a retired 
person,121 a student,122 or a person enjoying rights under Community law with sufficient 
resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system.123
The rights  of  family  members  of  EC national  workers  are  stipulated by Regulation 
1612/68/EEC on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, which is 
based  on  Article  49  of  the  EC Treaty.  Article  10  of  Regulation  1612/68  lists  the 
secondary beneficiaries of an EC worker’s right to family reunification. Article 10(1) 
states that “the following shall, irrespective of their nationality, have the right to install 
themselves with a worker who is a national of one Member State and who is employed 
in the territory of another Member State: (a) his spouse and their descendants who are 
under the age of 21 years or are dependants; (b) dependent relatives in the ascending 
line of the worker and his spouse”. Further on, Article 10(2) of Regulation 1612/68 
states that “Member States shall  facilitate the admission of any member of the family 
not coming within the provision of paragraph 1 if dependent on the worker referred to 
above or living under his roof in the country whence he comes” (emphasis added). 
Here again, the term “spouse” refers only to married partners of EC nationals. Such a 
narrow  interpretation  of  the  term  “spouse”,  which  excludes  any  stable  relationship 
119 See Articles 39 to 42 of the EC Treaty on freedom of movement of workers; Council Regulation 
1612/68 (n.3) on freedom of movement for workers within the Community; Council Dir. 68/360 [1968] 
OJ L 257/13 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for 
workers from Member States and their families.
120 See Articles 43 to 48 on establishment; Articles 49 to 55 on services; Council Dir. 73/148 [1973] OJ L 
172/14 on the abolition of restrictions on Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of 
services. 
121 See Council Directive 90/365 (n.3) on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons 
who have ceased their occupational activity; Article 39(3)(d) of the EC Treaty on the right of workers 
who have been employed in another Member State to remain in the territory of that Member State upon 
retirement; Commission Regulation 1251/70 (n.53) on the right of workers to remain in the territory of a 
Member State after having been employed in that State.
122 See Council Dir. 93/96 [1993] OJ L 317/59 on the right of residence for students.
123 See Council Dir. 90/364 (n.3) on the right of residence.
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outside civil marriage, was supported by the European Court of Justice in Reed.124 The 
case concerned a denial of the right of residence in the Netherlands to Ms. Reed, the 
unmarried  partner  of  a  British  national  employed  there.  Ms.  Reed  came  to  the 
Netherlands to join her long-term partner and registered for employment, but did not 
succeed in finding a job, and so remained unemployed. In responding to the question of 
whether Article 10(1) of Regulation 1612/68 must be interpreted to mean that a person 
who has a stable relationship with a worker is to be treated as his “spouse” for the 
purposes of that provision, the Court decided in the negative.125 The Court elaborated 
that the term “spouse” must be held to refer to a marital relationship only, due to “the 
absence of any indication of a general social development which would justify a broad 
construction, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the regulation” 
(emphasis added).126 The phrase “general social development” in the wording above 
suggests  that  interpretation  must  take  into  consideration  the  situation  in  the  whole 
Community, and not just one Member State.127 However, there are grounds for believing 
that, by the same wording, the Court has left open the possibility of broadening the legal 
definition of the term “spouse” should social changes across the Community so require. 
The judgement in  Diatta, analysed above, shows that the term “spouse” also refers to 
married  partners  not  living  under  the  same roof.128 Furthermore,  both  Diatta129 and 
Surinder Singh130 suggest that the term “spouse” does not include former spouses, i.e. 
spouses  whose  marriage  has  been  finally  dissolved.  Additionally,  Surinder  Singh 
reveals that a “sham” marriage will not cause either spouse to fall within the meaning of 
Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68. 131
As cited above, apart from referring to the primary beneficiary’s spouse, Article 10(1) 
of Regulation 1612/68 also encompasses “their descendants who are under the age of 21 
years or are dependants and dependent relatives in the ascending line of the worker and 
his  spouse”.  The  term  “descendants”  covers  all  children,  adopted  children  and 
grandchildren  of  either  the  primary  beneficiary  or  his  spouse,  i.e.  the  secondary 
beneficiary.  Such  an  interpretation  protects  the  children  of  third-country  nationals 
married  to  EC  nationals,  neither  of  whose  parents  is  a  Community  national.  In 
Baumbast the Court rightly stated that a more restrictive interpretation of this provision, 
which  would  grant  rights  only  to  children  common  to  the  migrant  worker  and  his 
spouse,  “would  run  counter  to  the  aim  of  Regulation  1612/68”.132 Similar  to 
“descendants”, the term “relatives” refers to all relatives in the ascending line of the 
primary and secondary beneficiary, not only their parents.133 Finally, the Court defined 
the concept of “dependency” in Lebon.134 Here the ECJ stated that “both Article 10(1) 
and 10(2)  of  Regulation 1612/68 must  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that  the  status  of 
dependent  members  of  a  worker’s  family  is  the  result  of  a  factual  situation”,  and 
continued by explaining that “the person having that status is a member of the family 
124 Case 59/85, Netherlands v. Reed [1986] ECR 1283.
125 Reed (n.124),para.16 
126 Reed (n.124),para.15 
127 Martin and Guild, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN THE EU, Butterworths, 1996, p. 143.
128 Diatta (n.8) para. 10
129 Diatta (n.8) para. 20
130 Singh (n.9) para.12
131 Ibid.
132  Baumbast and R (n.10) para.57
133 Martin and Guild, see n. 127
134 Case 316/85, Centre Public d’Aide Sociale de Courcelles v. Lebon [1987] ECR 2811.
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who is  supported  by the  worker  and there  is  no  need to  determine the  reasons  for 
recourse to the worker’s support or to raise the question whether the person concerned 
is able to support himself by taking up paid employment”.135 
The list of family members of other categories of EC nationals benefiting from the right 
to family reunification is identical or similar to the list of secondary beneficiaries of EC 
national  workers  stipulated  by  Regulation  1612/68.  For  example,  the  secondary 
beneficiaries of an EC worker who has been entitled to remain in the territory of a 
Member State after  having been employed in that  State are defined by Article 1 of 
Regulation  1251/70.136 The  family  members  benefiting  from family  reunification  in 
such a case are identical to  those named in Regulation 1612/68.137 Also,  the  list  of 
secondary beneficiaries of employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their 
occupational activity and wish to reside in a Member State in which they have never 
worked  is  given  in  Article  1(2)  of  Directive  90/365.138 This  list  of  secondary 
beneficiaries is slightly more restrictive than the one provided in Regulation 1612/68, 
insofar as descendants benefit from the right to family reunification only if they are 
dependents, irrespective of their age.139 Another directive from 1990, Directive 90/364, 
defines the rights of secondary beneficiaries of EC nationals who enjoy the right of 
residence in another Member State by having resources sufficient to avoid becoming a 
burden on the social assistance system.140 Here the wording of the provision pertaining 
to secondary beneficiaries is identical to Directive 90/365 and is thus, again, a bit more 
restrictive than Regulation 1612/68.141
Family  members  of  EC  nationals  who  are  self-employed  or  providers  of  services 
entitled to  the  right  to  family  reunification are  defined  by Article  1(c)  and 1(d)  of 
Directive 73/148.142 The list here is similar to that defined by Regulation 1612/68. The 
only difference between the two is  that  Directive 73/148 limits  family reunification 
rights to “children under 21 years of age” (emphasis added), while Regulation 1612/68 
provides for family reunification rights for “descendants who are under the age of 21” 
(emphasis added).143 However, this difference is not a substantial one, since Article 1(d) 
135 Lebon (n. 134) para.22
136 Commission Regulation 1251/70 (n.53) on the right of workers to remain in the territory of a Member 
State after having been employed in that State.
137 Article 1 of Regulation 1251/70 (n.53) states: “The provisions of this Regulation shall apply to 
nationals of a Member State who have worked as employed persons in the territory of another Member 
State and to members of their families, as defined in Article 10 of Council Regulation 1612/68 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Community”.
138 Council Directive 90/365 (n.3) on the right of residence of employees and self-employed persons who 
have ceased their occupational activity.
139 Article 1(2) of Directive 90/365 (n.3) grants the right of residence to the following family members of 
the primary beneficiary: “(a) his or her spouse and their descendants who are dependants; (b) dependent 
relatives in the ascending line of the holder of the right of residence and his or her spouse”.
140 Council Directive 90/364 (n.3) on the right of residence.
141 Article 1(2) of Directive 90/364 grants the right of residence to the following family members of the 
primary beneficiary: “(a) his or her spouse and their descendants who are dependants; (b) dependent 
relatives in the ascending line of the holder of the right of residence and his or her spouse”.
142 Council Directive 73/148 (n.120) on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services.
143Articles 1(c) and 1(d) of Directive 73/148 list the following secondary beneficiaries: Article1(c) of 
Directive 73/148 states: “the spouse and the children under 21 years of age of such nationals, irrespective 
of their nationality; while Article 1(d) states: “the relatives in the ascending and descending lines of such 
nationals and of the spouse of such nationals, which relatives are dependent on them, irrespective of their 
nationality”.
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of Regulation 73/148 covers descendants who are dependents. Thus the only category of 
secondary beneficiaries  covered by Regulation 1612/68 and excluded by Regulation 
73/148  are  descendants  who  are  neither  children  of  the  primary  beneficiary  or  his 
spouse, nor dependants (e.g. grandchildren under the age of 21 who are not dependents). 
One can therefore conclude that the group of family members benefiting from family 
reunification rights is a bit narrower in the case of EC nationals who are self-employed 
persons and providers of services than in the case of those who are workers. Finally, the 
list of secondary beneficiaries of an EC national student’s right to family reunification is 
the most restrictive, compared to that for workers, self-employed persons, providers of 
services, retirees and EC nationals entitled to the right of residence in another Member 
State by virtue of sufficient resources. The list of secondary beneficiaries of EC students 
has been narrowed down to a “student’s spouse and their dependent children”.144 One 
could argue that such a restriction is justified on the grounds that a student’s period of 
residence in a Member State is time-limited and, therefore, that the right of residence 
should  be  extended  only  to  absolutely  necessary,  i.e.  nuclear  family  members.145 
However,  the  fact  remains  that  the  Community  has  chosen  to  adopt  a  very  strict 
approach  in  this  case,  in  contrast  to  its  much  broader  approach  regarding  other 
categories of EC nationals.
To conclude, the list of secondary beneficiaries of the right to family reunification is 
most extensive in the case of EC workers and EC nationals entitled to remain in the 
territory of a Member State after  having been employed there.  The Community has 
adopted  a  slightly  more  restrictive  approach in  the  case  of  family  members  of  EC 
nationals who are self-employed persons, providers of services or persons not engaged 
in economic activities and covered by Directives 90/365 and 90/364. The least extensive 
approach has been chosen in the case of students’ family members. Generally speaking, 
the Community has once again recognised the free movement of workers and other EC 
nationals as one of its priorities, one which could not succeed without extension of these 
rights to their family members. 
4. Scope of Rights
The rights of family members of EC nationals derive from EC secondary legislation, i.e. 
from a number of directives and regulations which provide for a very broad spectrum of 
rights.  Regulation  1612/68  on  the  freedom  of  movement  of  workers  within  the 
Community enables EC national workers to circulate freely from one Member State to 
another. Such freedom of movement would not be complete without enabling workers 
to bring their closest family members with them, and without conferring certain rights 
on those family members so as to facilitate their integration in the host Member State. 
This aim is acknowledged in the preamble of Regulation 1612/68, which states that 
“freedom of movement constitutes a fundamental right of workers and their  families” 
(emphasis added), and that “...obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be eliminated, 
in particular as regards the worker’s right to be joined by his family and the conditions 
for  the  integration  of  that  family  into  the  host  country”  (emphasis  added).  These 
statements confirm the derivative nature of the rights granted to secondary beneficiaries. 
The first right granted to family members of EC migrant workers by Article 10(1) of 
Regulation 1612/68 is  the  right  to  “install  themselves  with  the  worker”.  This  right 
144 Article 1 of Council Directive 93/96 (n.122) on the right of residence for students.
145 Martin and Guild, see n. 127,p. 209.
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consists  of the right  to  enter  and reside in the host  Member State.  The Regulation, 
however, imposes an additional condition: namely, the worker must have housing for 
his family such as is considered normal for workers according to the standards of the 
region where he is employed.146 Family members of other categories of EC migrants, 
such  as  retirees,  self-employed  persons,  service  providers,  persons  with  sufficient 
resources, or students, are also granted entry and residence rights in the host Member 
State. According to Regulation 1251/70, family members of workers who have acquired 
the right to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed there 
are  likewise  granted  the  right  to  remain,  and can continue  to  do  so  even  after  the 
worker’s death.147 Family members can also, under certain conditions, acquire the right 
to remain in a case where the worker has died during his working life before having 
himself acquired the right to remain.148 Directive 90/365 on the right of residence for 
employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity and 
Directive 90/364 on the right of residence of EC migrants who have sufficient resources 
to  avoid  becoming  a  burden  on  the  social  assistance  system  also  grant  the  family 
members of such persons the right to remain in the territory of the host Member State. 
Similarly, the right of residence is also granted to family members of EC nationals who 
establish  themselves  in  another  Member  State  in  order  to  pursue  self-employed 
activities or to provide services (Directive 73/148). Finally, Directive 93/96 grants the 
right of residence to family members of student migrants who are EC nationals.
The second right granted by Regulation 1612/68 to an EC worker’s spouse and children 
under the age of 21 or dependent on him is the right to take up employment activities 
throughout  the  territory  of  the  host  Member  State.149 It  remains  unclear  why  this 
provision focuses  exclusively on the  right  to  employment,  without mentioning  self-
employed activities.  Some authors suggest that this provision nevertheless entails an 
implicit right to self-employment, whose refusal would otherwise lead to a breach of the 
equal  treatment  principle  contained  in  Article  7(2)150 of  Regulation  1612/68.151 
Significantly, the three directives on the right of residence for economically inactive EC 
migrants  contain  a  similar  provision,  but  without  this  restriction.  The  spouse  and 
dependent  children  of  an  employee  or  self-employed  person  who  has  ceased  his 
occupational activity, of an EC migrant who has sufficient resources to avoid becoming 
a burden on the social assistance system, and of an EC national student migrant are 
explicitly  granted  the  right  to  take  up  both  employed  and  self-employed  activities 
anywhere within the territory of the host Member State.152 
Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 grants the children of an EC national migrant worker 
the right to be admitted to the host Member State’s general education, apprenticeship 
and  vocational  training  system  under  the  same  conditions  as  nationals  of  the  host 
Member State.  Finally,  family members  of EC workers benefit  from Article 7(2) of 
146 Article 10(3) of Regulation 1612/68 (n.3)
147 Article 3(1) of Regulation 1251/70 (n.53)
148 Article 3(2) of Regulation 1251/70.
149 Article 11 of Regulation 1612/68.
150 Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68 stipulates that the worker “shall enjoy the same social and tax 
advantages as national workers”.
151 Martin and Guild, see n.145, p. 146.
152 Article 2(2) of Directive 90/365 (n.3) on the right of residence for employees and self-employed 
persons who have ceased their occupational activity; Article 2(2) of Directive 90/364(n.3) on the right of 
residence; Article 2(2) of Directive 93/96 (n.122) on the right of residence.
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Regulation 1612/68, stipulating that a worker who is a national of one Member State 
enjoys the same social and tax advantages in the territory of another Member State as 
workers who are nationals of that State. Such a principle of equal treatment with regard 
to  social  advantages has  been extended to  family  members  of  EC national  migrant 
workers  by the  European Court  of  Justice.  In  Lebon,  the  Court  stated  that  a  broad 
interpretation of the equal treatment provision, which also encompasses the worker’s 
family  members,  “contributes  to  the  integration  of  migrant  workers  in  the  working 
environment of the host country in accordance with the objectives of the free movement 
of  workers”.153 However,  the  Court  then  continued by  specifying  that  the  worker’s 
family members qualify only indirectly for the equal treatment accorded to a worker by 
Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, and only if such benefits may be regarded as social 
advantages for the worker himself within the meaning of the provision.154 In  Deak, a 
case concerning a Hungarian national living in Belgium with his Italian mother – a 
migrant worker – and claiming Belgian unemployment benefits, the ECJ clarified that 
the equal treatment principle laid down in Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68 indirectly 
applies to family members regardless of their nationality.155 Significantly, the right to 
social advantages also applies to family members of workers entitled to remain in the 
territory of a Member State after having been employed there (Article 7 of Regulation 
1251/70), but not to other categories of EC migrants and their family members.
5. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has offered a detailed analysis of current developments in the 
area  of  family  reunification,  and  offered  answers  to  a  number  of  issues  raised  by 
existing Community legislation and case-law in this area. Three general observations 
may be made based on the analysis above. 
First, Community legislation and case-law on family reunification for EC nationals is 
clearly moving away from the perception of family reunification as an economic right, 
based on  the  free  movement  principle  and the  internal  market  objective,  towards a 
conception of it  as a social  right and, ultimately,  a fundamental  right to respect for 
family  life,  one  which  is  applicable  not  only  to  EC  nationals,  as  the  primary 
beneficiaries, but also to their family members as secondary beneficiaries. The more 
this process develops, the further away it moves from its original objective related to the 
internal  market  and  free  movement,  and  comes  closer  to  an  acceptance  of  family 
members  as  individuals  per  se.  The  current  approach  is  only  one  step  away  from 
abandoning the cross-border movement requirement, thereby entirely letting go of free 
movement as the legal basis for family members’ rights. This trend is occurring hand in 
hand with the process of extending the levels of European integration and creating a 
“multi-faceted Union”. 
Second, a number of cases decided by the European Court of Justice in the area of 
family  reunification  for  EC nationals  reveal  the  prominent  role  the  Court  has  been 
playing in the protection and expansion of family members’ rights.156 The Court has 
153 Lebon (n.134) para.11
154 Lebon (n.134) para.12
155 Case 94/84, Office national de l'emploi v Joszef Deak [1985] ECR 1873, paragraph 26.
156 On the other hand, cases such as Case C-243/91, Belgian State v. Taghavi [1992] ECR I-4401, Case 
316/85, Centre public d'aide sociale de Courcelles v Marie-Christine Lebon [1987] ECR 2811 and Case 
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given a broad interpretation to a number of provisions dealing with family reunification, 
such as Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68, specifying that this provision does not require 
a family member to live under the same roof as the primary beneficiary,157 and Article 
12  of  Regulation  1612/68,  stating  that  the  educational  rights  granted  to  primary 
beneficiary’s  children comprise the right of the parent who is their primary carer to 
reside with them.158 The Court’s reasoning in  Carpenter159 and  Akrich,160 on the other 
hand, suggests that it has taken the pulse of the Community and is moving from the 
economic into the social and human dimension of the free movement principle, with the 
ultimate goal (not yet completely reached) of approaching family reunification entirely 
outside the free movement principle, and instead within the framework of fundamental 
human rights.
Third,  Community  legislative  activity  in  the  area  of  family  reunification  for  EC 
nationals has a number of flaws, and can be considered partly outdated with regard to 
the present moment of European integration, such as in the case of Regulation 1612/68, 
which  excludes  unmarried  partners  as  family  members  eligible  for  family 
reunification161 (apart from a situation in which Reed could apply). Most importantly, all 
current Community legislation on family reunification for EC nationals is part of the 
legislation on free movement. It therefore places family reunification rights exclusively 
within  the  context  of  the  free  movement  principle  and  the  cross-border  movement 
requirement. Considering the general trend in this area, which is distancing itself from 
the  free  movement  principle  and a strict  interpretation  of  what  constitutes  a  purely 
internal  situation,  one  could  generally  conclude  that  the  basic  premises  on  which 
Community legislation dealing with family reunification for EC nationals is founded 
may  be  considered  inappropriate  and  outdated  at  the  present  moment  of  European 
history.
Bearing in mind the present status of family reunification in the EU, what future trends 
could one expect in the short and medium term? Two important developments need to 
be considered here in order to reach any general conclusion. The first is the adoption of 
Directive 2004/58/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 
73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. The 
second document which is of crucial importance for the overall process of European 
integration is the EU Constitution adopted at the Brussels European Council on 17 and 
18 June 2004.
C-356/98, Kaba v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] ECR I-2623 illustrate the Court’s 
readiness to impose limitations on the interpretation Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, which deals with 
equality in social advantages, in certain cases where this article is used to grant rights to migrant workers’ 
family members.
157 Diatta , see n.8
158 Baumbast and R, see n.10
159 Carpenter, see n.38
160 Akrich, see n.5
161 The same exclusion of unmarried partners is valid for other legislative acts dealing with EC migrants, 
such as Regulation 1251/70, Directive 73/148, Directive 90/365, Directive 90/364 and Directive 93/96. 
On the other hand, the Family Reunification Directive leaves it to Member States’ national law to decide 
whether unmarried partners are to be granted the same rights as primary beneficiaries’ spouses.
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As its title clearly states, Directive 2004/58 on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their  family members  to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, will, as of 30 April 2006, replace Articles 10 and 11 of Regulation 1612/68 and 
Directives 64/221, 68/360, 72/194, 73/148, 75/34, 75/35, 90/364, 90/365 and 93/96.162 
The new Directive 2004/58 entered into force on 29 April 2004, and must be transposed 
into Member States’ national legal systems by 30 April 2006. It resulted primarily from 
the need for a single instrument that would simplify and streamline previously existing 
arrangements in the field of free movement and residence rights for EU citizens and 
their  family  members.163 It  takes  into  consideration  “the  new  legal  and  political 
environment established by the citizenship of the Union” and relies on EU citizenship as 
the legal basis for the right to free movement and residence of EC nationals and their 
family  members.164 Despite  this,  the  Directive  does  not  eliminate  the  cross-border 
movement  requirement  necessary in  order  to  avoid internal  situations,  since  it  only 
covers situations where an EC national moves to reside in another Member State. It can 
therefore be  deduced that  Directive  2004/58 follows the  reasoning of  the  European 
Court of Justice in Uecker and Jacquet, where it stated that citizenship of the Union is 
not intended to extend the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty to internal situations 
which have no connection with Community law.165 
The  two  most  important  substantive  contributions  made  by  Directive  2004/58  are 
entailed  in  Articles  2(2)(b)  and  13.  Article  2(2)(b)  stipulates  that  the  term “family 
member” also encompasses partners “with whom the Union citizen has contracted a 
registered  partnership,  on  the  basis  of  the  legislation  of  a  Member  State,  if  the 
legislation  of  the  host  Member  State  treats  registered  partnerships  as  equivalent  to 
marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of 
the host Member State”.166 This provision is a step forward from the judgement in Reed, 
which ruled out the possibility of interpreting the term “spouse” in Article 10(1) of 
Regulation 1612/68 so as to include partners in a stable relationship.167 However, the 
innovation  introduced  by  Article  2(2)(b)  of  Directive  2004/58  can  be  viewed  as  a 
follow-up to the Court’s explanation of its judgement in  Reed, which suggested that 
there was room for broadening the definition of the term “spouse” in the case of a 
general social change across the Community.168  In this line of thought, Article 2(2)(b) is 
a product of the Community’s legislative recognition of such a social development.169 
162 Article 38(1) and 38(2) of Commission Dir. 2004/58 [2004] OJ L 120/26
163 Indent 3 and 4 of the Preamble to Directive 2004/58. See also Title 1.4 of the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
(COM(2001)257 final).
164 Indent 1 and 2 of the Preamble to Directive 2004/58 (n.162)
165 Cases C-64 & 65/96, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Kari Uecker and Vera Jacquet [1997] ECR I-3171, 
para,23
166 See also Indent 5 of the Preamble to Directive 2004/58.
167 Reed (n.124) para.16
168 Ibid.,para.15 
169 Commentary of Article 2(2) of the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States (COM(2001)257 final) states: “The ‘family group’ has been recently undergoing rapid 
change and more and more people, often with children, are forming ‘de facto’ couples. Furthermore, 
several Member States have introduced a special status, with a set of rights and obligations, which 
cohabiting unmarried couples can register for. In the context of the right of residence, Community law 
cannot ignore this development, so the proposal is to treat unmarried partners as equivalent to spouses for 
residence purposes, where the legislation of the host Member State provides for unmarried partner status 
and on the terms of any such legislation.”
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The second,  and probably most  important,  contribution of  Directive  2004/58 to the 
protection and extension of family reunification rights is Article 13, on the retention of 
the  right  of  residence  by  family  members  in  the  event  of  divorce,  annulment  of 
marriage,  or  termination  of  registered  partnership.  This  provision  rules  out  the 
possibility  of revoking the right  of residence in a host  Member State for secondary 
beneficiaries  whose  relation  with  the  primary  beneficiary  has  been  terminated  by 
divorce, annulment of marriage, or termination of registered partnership.170 Therefore, it 
provides a solution in cases where the break-up of a family relation between a primary 
and secondary beneficiary could harm a third-country national’s fundamental  rights. 
This means that the situation suggested by the Court in Diatta and Singh, where a third-
country  national  would  face  possible  expulsion  from  the  host  Member  State  once 
divorce proceedings were finalised, will, by transposition of the Directive into Member 
States’ national legal systems, no longer be possible. This is a remarkable improvement 
from the  Court’s  reasoning  in  Diatta171 and  Singh,172 and  shows  the  importance  of 
legislative  action  in  cases  where  no  initiative  has  been  given  by  the  Court.  This 
safeguard, whose sole purpose is to protect the secondary beneficiary’s  fundamental 
rights and human dignity, is in line with Weiler’s reasoning cited above.173
It  can  be  concluded  that  Directive  2004/58  offers  some  noteworthy  contributions, 
feeling the pulse of social  change in the Community as suggested by the European 
Court of Justice,  for example,  with regard to legislative protection of EC nationals’ 
registered partners, and extending protection for family members in new situations not 
previously handled by the Court, such as divorce, annulment of marriage, or termination 
of registered partnership. Despite these improvements and the unification of a number 
of legal acts into a single instrument, Directive 2004/58 still remains rooted in the free 
movement principle, and will therefore maintain the prominent role of the European 
Court  of  Justice  in  cases  like  Akrich,174 which  concern  the  extension  of  family 
reunification rights to situations further removed from a free movement legal basis.
The  second  important  development  that  has  possibly  affected  progress  in  family 
reunification  rights  in  the  Community  is  the  adoption  of  the  Treaty  establishing  a 
Constitution for Europe at the Brussels European Council on 17 and 18 June 2004. In 
the context of family reunification for EC nationals, the crucial part of the Constitution 
is its Part II, incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the Union and 
rendering  it  a  legally  binding  text  with  constitutional  status.175 Two  articles  are  of 
importance here. First, Article II-7, entitled “Respect for private and family life”, which 
stipulates that “everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, 
home and  communications”.  This  Article  is  almost  identical  to  Article  8(1)  of  the 
170 Article 13 of Directive 2004/58 (n.162). See also Indent 15 of the Preamble to Directive 2004/58 and 
Title 2.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States (COM(2001)257 final).
171 Diatta, see n. 8 
172 Singh, see n.9
173 Weiler, see n. 33
174 Akrich,see n.5
175 Article 7(1) of Part I, Title II (Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union) of the Constitution 
proclaims that “The Union shall recognise the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights which constitutes Part II of the Constitution”.
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms176 
and,  consequently,  must  be  interpreted  in  the  same  way  or,  alternatively,  more 
extensively.177 A  more  restrictive  interpretation  than  the  one  given  in  the  relevant 
Convention  article  is  prohibited.  Second,  Article  II-33,  entitled  “Family  and 
professional  life”,  states  in  its  first  paragraph  that  “the  family  shall  enjoy  legal, 
economic and social protection”. 
In this context, two questions have to be taken into consideration. First, will the legally 
binding nature of Articles II-7 and II-33 of the Constitution change the nature and level 
of protection for family reunification rights? Will the cross-border movement rule and 
purely internal situations still be possible in family reunification cases once the Charter 
becomes a legally binding document? Second, will the prospect of the Union’s future 
accession  to  the  European  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and 
Fundamental Freedoms and the actual act of accession affect the approach taken by the 
European Court of Justice when judging family reunification cases by extending the 
rights conferred on family members?178
As to the first question, it has already been concluded that the Court would have had no 
jurisdiction in both Carpenter and Akrich had a cross-border movement not taken place. 
This requirement is seen in its finest, most subtle form in  Akrich, where cross-border 
movement was still a requirement, yet no longer for the application of free movement 
legislation, but rather for the general principles of EC law. Will this change when the 
EU Constitution comes into force and the Charter becomes legally binding? It seems 
reasonable to believe that there will not be any change in this direction. Article II-51(1) 
of the Draft  Constitutional  Treaty stipulates  that  “the provisions of  this  Charter  are 
addressed to the Institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union with due regard for the 
principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States  only when they are implementing  
Union  law”  (emphasis  added).  It  further  elaborates  in  Article  II-51(2)  that  “[t]his 
Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the 
Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks 
defined in the other Parts of the Constitution”. This article implies that the Charter, 
despite its future status as a legally binding document, cannot apply to purely internal 
situations, since such situations do not allow for the application of Union law. In a 
situation like Akrich, this would mean that the Charter would not enable the ECJ to rely 
on its provisions protecting family life in cases where no cross-border movement has 
taken place. Thus, according to the wording of the future legally-binding Constitutional 
Treaty, Mr. Akrich could not be granted the right to stay in the host Member State 
without  his  wife’s  having exercised the  right  to  free  movement.  The Constitutional 
176 Article 8(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms states that “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence”. Unlike Article II-7 of the Constitution, the Convention elaborates the right to respect 
for family life in its Article 8(2): “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interest of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.”
177 Article II-52(3) states that “insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.”
178 Article 7(2) of the Constitution declares that “the Union shall seek accession to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”. 
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Treaty does not put an end to purely internal situations in family reunification cases, nor 
does it provide greater rights than those already granted.
The second question, i.e. the effect on the ECJ’s approach towards family reunification 
cases of the Union’s future accession to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, must be viewed in the context of the overall 
relationship between the European Court of Justice and the European Court for Human 
Rights that is to be created upon future accession. Following accession, the ECJ will 
remain the supreme judicial authority for interpretation of questions regarding Union 
law, thus including the Charter.179 The European Court for Human Rights will, however, 
have external control over issues resulting from the Union’s obligations arising from 
accession to the Convention, but only after all remedies within the EU system have been 
exhausted.180 The changing constellation between the two courts in dealing with human 
rights issues following the Union’s accession to the Convention might lead to the ECJ’s 
more  careful  observance  of  the  Strasbourg  court’s  position  in  matters  such  as  the 
protection of family life. Such a development could provide additional incentives to the 
ECJ’s  general  tendency  of  shifting  from a  free  movement  to  a  fundamental  rights 
position in family reunification cases.
179 Final report of the European Convention Working Group II, “Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to 
the ECHR” (CONV 354/02), 22 October 2002, p. 12.
180 Article 35(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.
